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THE STUDENT BORROWER: SLAVE
TO THE SERVICER?
William J. Cox*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“

[T]he borrower is slave to the lender.”1 This old Christian proverb
rang true for centuries, but as time has progressed, so has the
complexity of our financial transactions.2 For most of human history,
lenders collected on, or serviced, the loans they originated. Today,
third parties known as loan servicers typically perform this function.3
However, these servicers have no accountability to the borrowers they
collect from and often little accountability to the lenders with whom
they contract.4 This system of lending has become particularly
troubling in the context of student loans, shackling our nation’s youth

*

Senior Symposia Editor, Michigan State Law Review; J.D. 2015, Michigan
State University College of Law; B.A. 2012, The Ohio State University. The author
would like to thank Professor Mark Totten for his invaluable guidance and support
during the writing of this Article. The author would also like to thank Katherine
Wendt for her feedback and editorial assistance. Finally, the author would like to
thank the staff of the Loyola Consumer Law Review for all their helpful edits.
1
Proverbs 22:7.
2
See generally Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012)
(discussing how growing complexities in financial markets complicates regulation).
3
See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/198/whats-the-difference-between-amortgage-lender-and-a-servicer.html.
4
See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text (discussing how no party to
the student loan transaction holds both the ability and the incentive to hold a student
loan servicer accountable).
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with the heavy chains of student loan debt.5 Today, it seems that the
student borrower is slave to the servicer.
Currently, outstanding student loan debt stands at over $1.2
6
trillion. This amount eclipses all other forms of consumer debt in the
American economy aside from mortgage debt.7 In July 2013, the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a report
detailing the troubling story behind this staggering number and the
domino effect it has on other financial markets.8 For instance, high
amounts of student loan debt are forcing students to move back in
with their parents instead of buying a house,9 forgo start-up business
opportunities in favor of safer job opportunities,10 and dismiss job
opportunities in certain underserved sectors and locations.11 In fact,
the median net worth of college graduates who are under forty and
have student loan debt is only $8,700.12
Student loans are shackling our youth. This Article focuses on
the problems of the student loan servicing market, how these
problems have contributed to the staggering amount of student loan
debt, and how these problems can be solved.

5

See infra Section II.B (detailing the rampant abuses students faced under this
system).
6
Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(July
17,
2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-federal-loans-nowtop-a-trillion/. However, the CFPB speculates the actual amount of student loan debt
might be much larger. Id.
7
Eamon Javers, Parents Face the Student Loan Double Whammy, USA TODAY
(Sept.
2,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/02/parents-studentloan/2749233/.
8
Student Loan Affordability: Analysis of Public Input on Impact and Solutions,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
7-11
(2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201305_cfpb_rfi-report_student-loans.pdf.
9
Id. at 7 (explaining how home-ownership rates among the young have vastly
decreased as a result of student debt).
10
Id. at 8-9.
11
Id. at 9-11. The report specifically mentions the health care and teaching
sectors as those that have been the hardest hit by rising student loan debt. Id. at 910. Rural areas are the hardest hit locations. Id. at 10-11.
12
Walter Hamilton, Median Net Worth of Grads Under 40 with Student Debt Is
Only $8,700, LOS ANGELES TIMES (May 14, 2014, 9:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-young-people-with-student-debt-havemedian-net-worth-of-only-8700-20140514-story.html.
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A loan servicer is an entity that handles the day-to-day
management of loans.13 Loan servicers are often not the same entity
as the entity that originated or made the loan.14 In the student lending
arena, this is particularly true because the government originates all
federal loans while contracting out servicing work to the largest
student loan servicers.15 The abuses reported to the CFPB include
allegations that servicers are misapplying payments; applying
payments late; applying payments to loans with the lowest principal
and interest over those loans with higher amounts and interest rates;
giving inaccurate payoff information; placing students in the wrong
repayment plan; and transferring loans without adequate notice to
students.16 These abuses lead to excessive fees and extended
repayment times, hindering students’ ability to pay off their debt.17
Several issues currently exist in the student loan servicing
market. First, students are generally not economists.18 Using the
economic principles of rational choice theory, scholars have pointed
out that students are not economically rational, but instead display a
heavy optimism bias in their financial investments.19
Second, the relationship resulting from the complex lender–
student–servicer structure poses major obstacles to holding servicers
accountable for their actions. Some scholars have diagnosed this
problem as a principal–agent issue, where servicers (the agents) have
little to no incentive to do the bidding of their principals (lenders) and

13

See Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 23 (2011). The main responsibilities of servicers are transactional in nature:
sending payment statements to borrowers, collecting payments from borrowers,
applying payments from borrowers, and tracking account balances. Id.
14
See What’s the Difference Between a Mortgage Lender and a Servicer?,
supra note 3.
15
Christine DiGangi, Scoring Sallie Mae: How Student Loan Servicers are
Rated, FOXBUSINESS.COM (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/personalfinance/2013/10/02/scoring-sallie-mae-how-student-loan-servicers-are-rated/22.
16
See infra Section II.B.
17
Id.
18
While some may aspire to be, the issue of high student loan debt and the
obstacles to repayment caused by servicing abuses may well cut off these students’
access to such a commendable goal.
19
Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 8 (2008) (“Markets and contracts can be relied upon to maximize welfare only
when consumers are rational and informed.”); id. at 9 (discussing how optimism
bias and risk underestimation affects consumers’ financial transactions).
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even less incentive to do what is best for the borrower, who is left out
of this relationship.20 Under this type of transaction, students are not
technically consumers of “servicing products” and lack a contractual
relationship with the servicer.21 Instead, it is the lender who has made
a contract with the servicer and who has privity with the servicer.22
This can leave consumers outside the safety of both common law
remedies23 and some state consumer protection laws.24
Third, the statutory fixes to the consumer financial market
made under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act and the recent actions of the Executive Branch are not
sufficient to fix the problems currently plaguing the student loan
servicing market.25 Even the CFPB’s power to supervise certain
institutions that engage in “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or
practice[s]” (UDAAPs)26 is inadequate and will be of no use to state
attorneys general (SAGs),27 who have traditionally been at the
forefront of consumer protection.28 In spite of President Obama’s June
2014 presidential memorandum and the Department of Education’s
subsequent renegotiation of its contracts with federal student loan
servicers, student borrowers will still face abuses from federal loan
servicers because the order does not create the sort of enforcement

20

Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 69-70, 79-81.
Id. at 83.
22
See id. at 81-83.
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra notes 181-197 (discussing state consumer protection laws and their
applicability in the servicing market).
25
See infra Section V.A (discussing how the statutory changes made regarding
servicer regulation apply only to mortgage servicers and how the statutory
presumption against preemption does not apply to potential preemption of state
consumer protection laws by the Higher Education Act).
26
12 U.S.C. § 5531 (2012).
27
Gail Hillebrand, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Title X of the
Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 8
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 219, 223 (2011) (discussing the need for many enforcers in
consumer protection and how the inability for SAGs to enforce the general UDAAP
prohibition is an “odd wrinkle”).
28
Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys
General After Dodd–Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 123-24 (2013) (discussing how
before federal preemption ramped up, “[s]tates had been at the forefront of
consumer protection in the banking field for over a century”).
21
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mechanism that is required and advocated for in this Article.29 In any
event, these actions do not affect private student loan servicers and
will not protect student borrowers in the private market.30
A solution to the problems plaguing student loan servicing will
not be easy, but as the subprime mortgage crisis illustrates, any
practical solution will involve the states playing a central role.31
Throughout the mortgage crisis, a recurring issue was that the states
lacked the power to enforce many of their consumer protection laws
against national banks and their subsidiaries.32 While the Dodd–Frank
Act provides greater consumer financial protection, the mortgage
crisis has proven that the federal government is often too large and too
slow to react to rapidly changing financial markets.33 Further, the
servicing fixes in the Dodd–Frank Act were too finely tuned to the
issues prevalent in the mortgage market and will not provide much
relief in the context of student loan abuses.34 Instead, the CFPB must
step up and use its rulemaking power to define specifically the acts or
practices that constitute a UDAAP.35 Additionally, the states—who
attempted to lead the way during the mortgage crisis36—must be
29

See Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt,
79 Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014); Michael Stratford, Feds Overhaul Servicing
Contracts,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Sept.
2,
2014),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/02/education-departmentrenegotiates-contracts-student-loan-servicers
30
Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843; Stratford supra note 29.
31
The Causes and Current State of the Fin. Crisis: Hrg. Before the Fin. Crisis
Inquiry Comm’n 4 (Ill. 2010) (testimony of Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan),
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0114Madigan.pdf [hereinafter Madigan Testimony].
32
See Totten, supra note 28, at 123-25 (discussing obstruction by federal
regulators, who preempted state regulatory attempts).
33
See Carliss N. Chatman, HOLA Preemption and the Original Intent of
Congress: Are Federal Thrifts Necessary to Stabilize the Housing Market?, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 565, 606 (2013) (“The federal government has proven
that it is slow to react to changes in the residential mortgage industry, and that the
changing tides in Washington can have a major impact on its regulation of mortgage
servicing.”). Further, federal regulation of student loan servicers is almost
exclusively within the authority of the CFPB, and when power over a market is so
highly concentrated, there is always the possibility of agency capture. See infra
notes 304-305 and accompanying text.
34
See infra Section VI.A.
35
See infra Section VI.B.
36
See infra Section IV.B.
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given the power to act as a second line of defense, behind the CFPB,
in the protection of consumers in the field of student loan servicing.37
Part II of this Article details the problems inherent in the
average consumer of student loans and the abuses perpetrated by
student loan servicers. Part III discusses the problems students face
when attempting to bring their own suits. Part IV chronicles the dearth
of federal regulation that has existed in the servicing arena, including
the role the states have played in filling that void. Part V discusses the
impact of the new consumer protection regulations on the servicing
market, most importantly the creation of the CFPB. Finally, Part VI
proposes that these changes are insufficient, and suggests three
strategies to bring greater accountability to the student loan servicing
market: (1) greater access to consumer choice in choosing servicers;
(2) CFPB rulemaking to define what constitutes a UDAAP in the
market; and (3) the use of a coordinated SAG lawsuit to create a
settlement with substantive protections.
II.

HOW SERVICERS ARE SHACKLING STUDENTS WITH HIGH DEBT

While there has been an understandable concentration on
mortgage loan servicing given the subprime mortgage crisis,38 student
loans are quickly becoming just as pervasive of a problem in financial
markets.39 This Article starts with the extra-legal problems in the
market, which can be split into two categories: (1) the problems
inherent in the average student borrower;40 and (2) servicing abuses
that are a consequence of the ways in which loan servicers are
compensated.41

37

See Kurt Eggert, Foreclosing on the Federal Power Grab: Dodd–Frank,
Preemption, and the State Role in Mortgage Servicing Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REV.
171, 225 (2011) (“Given the lack of federal standards, and the go-ahead from
Dodd–Frank, the best strategy by states could well be to plow forward with effective
servicer regulation.”); see infra Section VI.D.
38
See Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the
Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727 (2009), for an indepth review of the subprime mortgage crisis.
39
See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (discussing how student loan
debt now surpasses all other forms of debt aside from mortgage debt and the domino
effects that this is causing).
40
See infra Section II.A.
41
See infra Section II.B.
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A. The Young, Uninformed, and Captive Consumer
While the American financial system is premised on laissezfaire economics, free choice only works to the extent that consumers
are actually able to make their own “informed and rational”
decisions.42 Unfortunately, many young Americans are not truly free
in their choice of how to pay for college—roughly 60% of students
take out loans to attend college each year,43 and higher education is
essential to young Americans striving to obtain the American dream.44
In fact, by 2018, 63% of new job openings will require at least some
form of college education.45 Additionally, the cost of attending
college keeps rising,46 forcing more students not only to take out
loans, but also to take out more expensive loans. “From the academic
year 2001-2002 to 2011-2012, the average total borrowing per student
increased by 55%.”47 In 2014, students graduating from four-year
institutions had an average debt of $29,400.48 The problems
associated with student lending will only increase as this level of
borrowing continues to grow.49
Further, while many students are left without a choice in how
to pay for college, many of those students also greatly overestimate

42

See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 7 (discussing how “freedom-ofcontract principle[s]” require an “informed and rational” consumer).
43
Student Loan Debt Statistics, AM. STUDENT ASSISTANCE,
http://www.asa.org/policy/resources/stats/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
44
Anthony P. Carnevale, Nicole Smith & Jeff Strohl, Help Wanted: Projections
of Jobs and Education Requirements Through 2018, at 13 (2010), available at
http://www9.georgetown.edu/grad/gppi/hpi/cew/pdfs/fullreport.pdf.
45
Id.
46
Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. 73,383, 73,385 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing,\ Trends in College Pricing 2012, COLL.
B D.
ADVOCACY
&
POLICY
CTR.,
at
7
(2012),
https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing-2012-fullreport_0.pdf) (stating that from 2000 to 2010, the average cost of attending a fouryear institution increased at a rate of 5.2% per year above the rate of inflation).
47
Id. (citing Trends in College Pricing 2012, COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY
CTR., at 4 (2012), https://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/college-pricing2012-full-report_0.pdf).
48
Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014).
49
See Section II.B, for a discussion of the problems in the market.
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their ability to repay their student loans.50 In one study, “over 50% of
the [college freshman] overestimated their future income upon
graduation.”51 This confidence is not surprising, considering many
college students are young consumers52 and have not yet had the
opportunity to learn from any other large financial transactions.53
Students’ lack of choice in how to pay for college, their
overestimation of their ability to repay debt, and their inexperience
with large financial transactions leaves them uniquely vulnerable
when they first encounter their student loan servicer.54
B. Servicing Abuses
The CFPB has done a commendable job in chronicling the
issues prevalent in the student loan servicing market, mainly through
the use of a specialized consumer complaint system.55 This system has
50

See Linda Simpson et al., College Debt: An Exploratory Study of Risk
Factors Among College Freshmen, 42 J. STUDENT FIN. AID 16, 22 (2012),
http://www.nasfaa.org/research/Journal/subs/College_Debt__An_Exploratory_Stud
y_of_Risk_Factors_Among_College_Freshmen.aspx.
51
Id.
52
Seventy-nine percent of college students in 2012 were between the ages
eighteen and twenty-four. U.S. College Student Demographics in 2012,
MARKETINGCHARTS.COM
(Sept.
12,
2013),
http://www.marketingcharts.com/wp/topics/demographics/us-college-studentdemographics-in-2012-36555/.
53
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 38 (discussing how because
consumers enter into few mortgage contracts they have fewer opportunities to learn
these large transactions than they do with smaller transactions like credit cards). In
fact, one of the more troubling problems with high student loan debt is that students
are not making large financial purchases, like houses, after graduating due to the
high amount of debt they must still pay back on their student loans. Student Loan
Affordability: Analysis of Public Input on Impact and Solutions, supra note 8, at 7-8;
Farran Powell, Gen-Yers Delay First-Time Home Buying, YAHOO! FIN. (June 7,
2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/gen-yers-delay-first-time-104900279.html.
54
This vulnerability is much higher for students who took out student loans and
did not complete college. See Susan Woodward, Consumer Confusion in the
Mortgage Market 22 (2003), http://www.sandhill.com/pdf/consumer_confusion.pdf
(finding that consumers with a college education saved an average of $1,500 on
their mortgage by avoiding excessive mortgage broker fees).
55
Lily Altavena, Consumer Protection Bureau Opens Student Loan Complaint
System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
9,
2012,
4:11
PM),
http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/consumer-protection-bureau-opensstudent-loan-complaint-system/.
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been instrumental in the CFPB documenting the widespread abuses
prominent in the student loan servicing market.56 Overall, the abuses
students reported to the CFPB can be broken down into two distinct
types: (1) attempts by servicers to extend the length of time the
student stays in repayment; and (2) servicers’ use of excessive
ancillary fees.57
1. Extending the Length of Repayment
Servicers are likely intentionally committing abuses as a
means to prolong the repayment process of students and thereby
obtain additional tranches, or cuts, of each student’s repayments.58 For
many private loans, servicers receive the first tranche in the form of a
predetermined percentage of the unpaid principal balance on the loans
that they service each month.59 Therefore, the longer the student stays
in repayment, the longer the servicer can continue to collect this
tranche.60 Unfortunately, the longer a student stays in repayment, the
more interest accrues, increasing the amount that student will have to
pay in the end.61
Federal loan servicer compensation works in a slightly
different manner.62 Servicers are compensated with a monthly flat
rate, which depends upon the status of the loan.63 This rate shrinks for

56

Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
5
(2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_student-loan-ombudsman-annualreport.pdf.
57
Id. at 2 (“Opaque or inaccurate payment processing [has] emerged as a
significant trend in complaints.”).
58
See infra notes 59-64.
59
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 37 (detailing the manner in which
mortgage servicers are compensated).
60
See id. at 38.
61
Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 910.
62
Redacted
Signed
Great
Lakes
Contract
Award,
https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de.
63
See, e.g., id. The CFPB estimated that the average amount was $1.68 per
month per account. Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing
Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,388 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing Title IV Redacted
Contract
Awards
12-13,
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a loan that goes into delinquency, but so long as the loan stays current,
the servicer collects the largest amount possible under the contract
each month.64 Therefore, even under this style of compensation,
servicers have an incentive to keep loans in repayment status for a
longer period of time, so they can continue to collect these payments.
Even if the student’s loans slip into the lower-compensated tiers of
delinquency and default, servicers can still charge students ancillary
fees for falling behind on their payments to cover the difference in
compensation tiers.65
The abuses under this category are especially troubling
because they often affect students who are simply trying to pay what
they owe to their servicer.66 Students are frequently unable to find out
from their servicers how payments are applied when paying more than
the minimum amount due.67 Even if students explicitly instruct a
servicer on how they want the extra payments applied, servicers often
disregard the instructions.68 These practices can create an abuse
because many students have more than one loan, and these loans can
have more than one interest rate.69 Servicers who apply the
overpayment to loans with lower interest rates end up increasing the
overall amount that students will have to repay, as those loans with
higher interest will have less of their principal paid down.70 This, in
turn, will extend the overall time that these students will stay in
debt.71 Doing so increases the number of tranches, or payments for
federal loans, that services will ultimately collect, thereby increasing
their bottom line at the expense of students.

https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de (last visited Feb. 17, 2014)).
64
See,
e.g.,
Redacted
Signed
Great
Lakes
Contract
Award,
https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=f
0b9abcbbad6bdddd83cc2be1a41e2de (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
65
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 41.
66
Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 811.
67
Id. at 8.
68
Id. at 9-10.
69
Id. at 9.
70
Id. at 9-10.
71
Id.
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2. Ancillary Fee Add-On
The second major issue student borrowers face is that servicers
are engaging in certain practices to rack up the number of ancillary
fees that student borrowers pay.72 Ancillary fees are “late fees . . . and
fees for any costs involved in collection.”73 Often, servicers are
allowed to keep all ancillary fees collected from the borrower.74
Therefore, servicers frequently have an incentive to play “add-on,” so
to speak, and charge students as many ancillary fees as possible.75
In situations where students do not have enough money to pay
their minimum amount due and instead attempt to pay a smaller
amount, rather than paying nothing at all,76 students encountered
servicers who misapplied their payments.77 In these situations,
servicers applied this underpayment by splitting it up so that none of
the student’s loans had the minimum amount due paid.78 By doing so,
students faced a late fee on each and every loan, even though the
servicer could have applied the payments in such a way that the
minimum amount due was paid on at least some of the student’s
loans.79
Students also reported that they were making payments before
the due date but the payments were processed afterwards, leading to
late fees.80 Check payments would often be inexplicably lost in the
mail.81 Student loan servicers also frequently gave students inaccurate
pay-off information.82 Therefore, students who attempted to pay off
their entire outstanding debt were often told their debt was one
amount when the amount was a little more.83 Students did not find out
that their loan had not been paid off until the loan went into
72

See Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at

11-14.
73

Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 41.
See id.
75
See id.
76
The CFPB calls these “good faith payments.” Annual Report of the CFPB
Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 11-12.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 13.
81
Id. at 14.
82
Id.
83
Id.
74
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delinquency or default.84 This practice again resulted in servicers
charging late fees for the number of payments missed.85
Students encountered numerous problems when their loans
were transferred from one servicer to another.86 Students usually have
no control over servicer transfers, which are decisions made by the
holder of the loan.87 The most common problem that students whose
loans were transferred to a different servicer faced was a lack of
notice.88 This lack of adequate notice led both to students paying their
old servicer and students paying in a payment method that, while
accepted by their previous servicer, was not accepted by their new
servicer.89 Both of these mistakes led to students being charged
ancillary fees.90 Moreover, when loans were transferred from one
servicer to another, student borrowers reported that they were placed
into the wrong repayment plan.91 One especially disconcerting
observation is that transfer problems are exceedingly prevalent with
loans originating through the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan
Program.92
Another troubling problem is that many of these inappropriate
fees are likely never discovered.93 In mortgage servicing,
inappropriate ancillary fees charged by servicers have often only been
discovered in bankruptcy hearings, at which point they have been
challenged.94 However, student loans cannot be discharged through

84

Id. For federal student loans, delinquency starts from the first day that a
payment is missed until the borrower defaults, and default occurs once a student has
missed payments for either 270 or 330 days, depending upon under what program
the student borrowed. Don’t Ignore Your Student Loan Payments or You’ll Risk
Going into Default, FED. STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/default
(last visited Feb. 17, 2014). Additionally, servicers report all delinquencies of over
90 days to the three major credit reporters. Id.
85
Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra note 56, at 14.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. 73,383, 73,386 (Dec. 6, 2013).
92
Id. This could be described as the equivalent of government-sanctioned
abuse.
93
See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
94
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 44.
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bankruptcy unless the student can show undue hardship,95 which is a
monumentally high standard that few borrowers can meet.96 Often,
students must face a debilitating mental or physical impairment or
other extreme hardship for the courts to discharge their student loan
debt.97 This high standard likely deters borrowers from even
attempting to discharge their student loans through a bankruptcy
hearing, leaving many of these potentially abusive ancillary fees
undiscovered. Worse, some servicers are affirmatively lying to
student borrowers by telling them that their loans are not
dischargeable in bankruptcy at all.98 However, even if students do
notice such fees, they must sill jump through a myriad of hoops to
protect themselves.99
III.

ATTEMPTS AT CONSUMER SELF-PROTECTION

The susceptible characteristics of the student borrower coupled
with the abuses perpetrated by student loan services create a wrong
that demands a solution.100 However, in many such scenarios the
95

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012).
Brendan Baker, Deeper Debt, Denial of Discharge: The Harsh Treatment of
Student Loan Debt in Bankruptcy, Recent Developments, and Proposed Reforms, 14
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1213, 1214 (2012) (calling student loans “virtually impossible to
discharge in bankruptcy”); Mark Kantrowitz, Congress Proposes Allowing Private
Student Loans to Be Discharged in Bankruptcy, FASTWEB (Apr. 22, 2010), http://
www.fastweb.com/financial-aid/articles/2259-congress-proposes-allowing-privatestudent-loans-to-be-discharged-in-bankruptcy (finding that only twenty-nine
borrowers in bankruptcy in 2008 were able to have their student-loan debt
discharged).
97
Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 799
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2010) (“Many courts . . . place dispositive weight on the debtor’s
ability to demonstrate ‘additional extraordinary circumstances’ that establish a
‘certainty of hopelessness.’ This has led some courts to require that the debtor show
the existence of ‘unique’ or ‘extraordinary’ circumstances, such as the debtor’s
advanced age, illness or disability, psychiatric problems, lack of usable job skills,
large number of dependents or severely limited education.”) (quoting Hicks v. Educ.
Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hicks), 331 B.R. 18, 27-28 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)).
98
Supervisory Highlights, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 17 (Fall
2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_supervisory-highlights_fall2014.pdf (“CFPB examiners found one or more supervised entities that were
misrepresenting to consumers that student loans are never dischargeable in
bankruptcy.”).
99
See infra Part III.
100
See supra Part II.
96
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traditional claims in contract common law have proven insufficient.101
Due to the extreme difference in power between loan servicers and
student borrowers, this is an ideal field for consumer law to provide
students with greater protections than what are normally available.102
However, private enforcement of consumer protection statutes still
presents many of the same obstacles, including a lack of privity
between the servicer and the student, the reluctance of courts to find
that a servicing contract constitutes an assignment, and the limited
knowledge of and lack of incentive for most students to pursue a
claim.
Historically, a borrower’s only recourse against potentially
abusive or deceptive consumer financial practices was the common
law.103 However, common law claims quickly became inadequate to
handle the complex and rapidly changing financial industry.104 The
most applicable common law protections to students who face issues
with their student loan servicer are the contract doctrines of breach
and unconscionability.105 The doctrine of unconscionability allows
courts to not only strike certain terms in contracts, but also to cancel
entire contracts if they “shock the conscience and are the product of a
flawed bargaining procedure.”106 However, courts have been very
reluctant to use this doctrine in consumer financial transactions.107
Instead of asserting an unconscionability claim against an
originator, borrowers could attempt to assert a breach-of-contract
101

Totten, supra note 28, at 119.
See Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law,
7 CHAP. L. REV. 155, 157 (2004) (discussing how consumer law attempts to provide
consumers greater protections because of “asymmetric information (or wholesale
consumer ignorance), unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer
preferences”). (citing Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy:
An Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815,
817, 824-25 (1987)).
103
Totten, supra note 28, at 119.
104
Id.
105
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 71.
106
Id. (citing ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed.1999)). Students
could make the argument that their contract with the originator is unconscionable
because the contract contains several terms that could shock the conscience,
including free assignability and the ability for any servicer to charge exorbitant
ancillary fees. Students could also argue that the process by which the contract was
negotiated was deeply flawed in that the loan originator held all of the power over
the student, forcing them to sign a contract of adhesion. See supra Part II.
107
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 71.
102
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claim against the servicer for failing to apply payments properly and
timely, or for failing to give proper notice of a servicing transfer, or
for whatever other abuses the servicer might have perpetrated. One
issue with this strategy is that the contract might not forbid such
practices, even though such practices could be considered abusive,
deceptive, or unfair.108 The bigger issue with this strategy is the lack
of privity between the student borrower and the servicer.109 Because
the servicer contracts with the lender, and not the borrower, it is the
lender that is in privity with the servicer.110 Therefore, a consumer’s
claim against a servicer will likely fail, as the contractual relationship
between the two “clearly does not support [a] breach of contract claim
given the lack of privity between the servicer and the [borrower].”111
Instead, only lenders can hold servicers accountable.112 These
lenders, however, often lack the necessary incentives to pursue an
action because any action taken would likely adversely affect their
bottom line.113 The complexity of an added party in financial
transactions has created a problem where “there is no party with the
ability and incentive to monitor a servicer’s actions,” leaving students
slaves to the actions of servicers.114
Some scholars argue that the problems inherent in the average
student borrower further contribute to this lack of a principal–agent
relationship because many borrowers do not know that they should be
able to bargain over to whom the loan can be assigned.115 While

108

See infra Section VI.C (discussing the desirability of the CFPB defining
these acts or practices as such).
109
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 81-83.
110
Id.
111
Griffin v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing (In re Griffin), No. 10-22431-RDD,
2010 WL 3928610, at *7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (holding that a mortgage
servicer is not in contractual privity with a mortgagor, and that therefore, a claim of
a breach of contract could not go forward).
112
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 81.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. If it is, in fact, an assignment that is at issue. See infra notes and 120-123
and accompanying text (discussing how the designation of a servicing contract as an
assignment is likely missing the mark). According to BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(9th ed. 2009), an assignor is “[o]ne who transfers property rights or powers to
another.” Of course, an assignor can always transfer only part of his or her interests
or powers. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), assignment (defining partial
assignment as “[t]he immediate transfer of part but not all of the assignor’s right”).
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certainly interesting, bargaining over a servicer is likely only possible
in the context of mortgages and private student loans. Newly
originated federal student loans are assigned only to certain preapproved servicers: Title IV Additional Servicers (TIVAS).116
Therefore, if the government has not contracted with a certain
servicer, pursuant to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965,
then the student cannot bargain to have that servicer service their
loan.117 Further, after the government measures a servicer’s
performance in a variety of areas, federal loans are contracted out to
these servicers without any input from the affected student
borrower.118 Therefore, bargaining over servicers would likely only
help the small percentage of student borrowers who take out private
loans.119
More importantly, having students negotiate over their
servicers, which has been discussed in terms of assignability,120 raises
an important issue because the designation of a servicing contract as
an assignment might be missing the mark. If the loan was being
assigned to a servicer, then privity would be created between the
borrower and the servicer, allowing them to assert any common law
or statutory claims they might have against a servicer.121 Yet, federal
courts have held that the servicing of loans does not constitute an
assignment.122 The courts deciding so follow a rather straightforward
116

Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. 73,383, 73,386 (Dec. 6, 2013) (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-81 (2012)).
117
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-81).
118
DiGangi, supra note 15. These areas include “default rates by number of
loans and by dollar value, and the combination of their customer satisfaction and
default rankings[.]” Id.; see Section VI.B, for a discussion on granting students the
ability to pick their own servicer from the pre-approved TIVASs.
119
The CFPB estimates that TIVASs “account for between approximately 67 to
87% of activity in the market.” Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan
Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,387 (June 9, 2014). Further, the Bureau
estimates that federal student loans account for more than 90% of all new student
loans. Id. at 73,388.
120
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83 (“If homeowners were worried
about servicing risk, they would bargain over assignability.”).
121
Assignments, USLegal.com, assignments.uslegal.com, (last visited July 28,
2014) (citing Merchs. Servs. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 25 Cal. 2d 109, 113 (Cal.
1950)).
122
See e.g., Short v. Wells Fargo Bank Minn., 401 F. Supp. 2d 549, 563
(S.D.W. Va. 2005); Wile v. Green Tree Servicing, No. Civ.A. 04-2866, 2004 WL
2644390, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2004).
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Truth in Lending Act provision, which explicitly states that “a
servicer . . . shall not be treated as an assignee.”123
In a 2013 Ohio Supreme Court case, Anderson v. Barclay’s
Capital Real Estate, Inc.,124 the Court held that Ohio’s consumer
protection statute did not protect consumers from the practices of
servicers. The Court made two important holdings on the definition of
a consumer transaction under the state consumer protection statute.125
First, the Court held that mortgage servicers do not provide a service
to the consumer but instead provide a service to the mortgage note
holder.126 This holding echoes the principal–agent issue confronting
borrowers, and prevents students from bringing claims under both the
common law and Ohio’s consumer protection statute.127 Second, the
Court held—without any discussion—that a servicing contract
between a lender and a servicer does not constitute an assignment.128
Since the servicing of a student loan does not constitute an
123

15 U.S.C. § 1641(f) (2006).
Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., 136 Ohio St. 3d 31, 2013Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶¶ 15-17, 29-32 (holding that mortgage servicing is
not a consumer transaction that the Ohio Consumer Sales Protection Act covers and
that servicers are not suppliers within the Act’s definition).
125
Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Ohio’s consumer protection statute defines a consumer
transaction to be “a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other transfer of an
item of goods, a service, a franchise, or an intangible, to an individual for purposes
that are primarily personal, family or household.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1345.01(A) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
126
Anderson, 136 Ohio St. 3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶¶ 1517.
127
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83. Additionally, this first holding is
extremely important to the enforcement of Ohio’s Consumer Sales Protection Act.
See infra notes 180-181 and accompanying text (discussing how this holding affects
the ability of the Ohio Attorney General to bring consumer protection claims against
loan servicers). While Section IV.B only discusses SAG enforcement of state
consumer protection statutes, the applicability of these statutes is the same
regardless of a suit brought by a SAG or by a student borrower.
128
The Court simply states that “in the servicing of a real estate mortgage, one
essential element of R.C. 1345.01(A) is not met: there is no sale, lease, assignment,
award by chance or other transfer of a service to a consumer.” Anderson, 136 Ohio
St. 3d 31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997, at ¶ 15 (emphasis added) (citing OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01(A)). Additionally, the Court made a third holding,
which was their second explicit holding, that is important to the application of
Ohio’s consumer protection statute, but need not be expounded upon here. Id. ¶¶ 2932 (holding that servicers were not suppliers within the meaning of Ohio’s
consumer protection statute).
124
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assignment, the student lacks any sort of legal relationship with the
servicer to bring a common law claim or an unfair or deceptive acts or
practices (UDAP) claim under state consumer protection laws that
require this relationship, such as Ohio.129 While state UDAP
prohibitions will be expounded upon at greater length in the
discussion of SAG enforcement of these laws,130 it will suffice for
now to say that state UDAP prohibitions are roughly the equivalent of
their federal UDAAP analogue.131
However, even if students had the ability to hold servicers
accountable through lawsuits, as they do in some states,132 the issue of
the uninformed and overly optimistic consumer remains.133 First,
students may not notice a servicer’s inappropriate acts or practices, or
the fees servicers charged.134 Should students even notice a charge,
they are unlikely to have the motivation to challenge what will, in all
probability, only be a small fee.135 However, just one improper $15
late fee assessed to 7,000 loans results in the servicer receiving an
additional $105,000 in revenue,136 and a consumer has no way of
knowing if these fees are systemic in nature.137 Therefore, these
obstacles make student-initiated consumer protection under either the
framework of the common law or state consumer protection statutes
an inadequate remedy for the abuses perpetrated by servicers.138
Instead, both the CFPB and SAGs have large consumer
complaint databases, which are able to document any systemic illegal
practices by student loan servicers.139 Therefore, these entities—in
129

See infra notes 190-193 and accompanying text (discussing the states which
interpret their statutes in the same way as Ohio).
130
See infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
131
For an in-depth discussion on UDAP laws and how they differ from the
federal UDAAP law see infra notes 252-257.
132
See infra notes 182-188 and accompanying text.
133
See supra Section II.A.
134
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 43.
135
Id. Consumers have little incentive to “haggl[e] over . . . $15 or even
$1,000.” See id. (discussing the unlikelihood of consumers bringing actions for
small amounts of money once a mortgage is in default).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
This proposition is applicable both to common law claims, which were
discussed in depth in this Section, and state law UDAP claims, which are discussed
more in depth in Section IV.B in the context of SAG enforcement of these laws.
139
Totten, supra note 28, at 160-61.
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cooperation with one another—must be the ones to lead the charge in
the battle for greater financial consumer protection.140 Unfortunately,
SAGs have historically been frustrated in their attempts to provide
greater accountability in the servicing market.141 This has led to a
long-existing lack of regulation of loan servicers.142
IV.

THE HISTORY OF THE LOAN SERVICING MARKET: REGULATION
AND THE LACK THEREOF

Legal scholarship on loan servicing has focused largely on the
issues in the mortgage servicing market.143 Throughout the history of
the mortgage servicing market, there has been a great deal of
confusion as to which federal agency should regulate this market.144
In fact, when the 2008 financial crisis occurred, “regulators seemed
almost mystified as to who regulated mortgage servicers and how
servicers should be regulated.”145 Prior to and during the crisis, many
states attempted to fill the gap left by the uncertainty in federal
oversight.146 However, they were often preempted by federal
regulators who were responsible for the financial soundness of many
of these servicers as financial institutions and saw servicer regulation
as a threat to these institutions’ bottom lines.147

140

Id. at 161 (“In addition to sharing information, the states and the CFPB can
also partner to analyze and respond to consumer-complaint information in a manner
that is more efficient and effective than would be possible through individual efforts
alone.”).
141
See infra notes 164-166 and accompanying text.
142
See infra Part IV.
143
Although this Article will briefly discuss some of the issues in the mortgageservicing market and the steps taken to remedy them, more complete discussions
can be found in Aleatra P. Williams, Foreclosing Foreclosure: Escaping the
Yawning Abyss of the Deep Mortgage and Housing Crisis, 7 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y
455 (2012), and Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13.
144
Eggert, supra note 37, at 172.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 172-73.
147
Id.
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A. The Federal History of Inaction

Prior to the changes of the Dodd–Frank Act,148 the federal
regulatory scheme was fragmented.149 The Office of the Comptroller
of Currency (OCC) regulated national banks.150 The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) regulated state banks that are not a part
of the Federal Reserve.151 The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
regulated federal savings associations and state-chartered banks that
are a part of the Federal Reserve.152 Finally, the National Credit
Union Administration (NCUA) regulated both federal- and statechartered credit unions.153 However, in the years leading up to the
mortgage crisis, federal regulators rarely pursued enforcement actions
against the financial companies they regulated.154 From 1995 to 2007,
the OCC did not issue “a public enforcement order against any of the
eight largest national banks.”155 In the end, all this federal oversight
did little more than “create[] a degree of friction with state law, which
[has] historically dominated the field of consumer protection.”156
The lack of oversight can be largely attributed to two causes.
First, federal regulators lacked incentives to bring enforcement actions
against these institutions157 because these regulators were not only
responsible for the oversight of these institutions, but also for these
institutions’ financial soundness.158 Second, these regulatory agencies
were compensated partly based on the number of institutions they
148

The changes made under this Act are explored in Part V.
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 86
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Credit Card Practices: Current Consumer and Regulatory Issues: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H.
Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 70 (2007) (written testimony of Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School)
[hereinafter Wilmarth Testimony].
155
Id.
156
JOHN A. SPANOGLE, JR. ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
163 (4th ed. 2013).
157
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 90.
158
Id. (“These agencies are designed with a primary mission to protect the
safety and soundness of the banking system. This means protecting banks’
profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority.”).
149
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regulated, and the institutions themselves were often free to choose
their own regulators.159 This compensation scheme resulted in a “race
to the bottom, where the banking agencies sought to increase market
share by minimizing consumer protections.”160 Therefore, these
regulators had no incentive to enforce any consumer protection law
because it might have affected the entity’s profitability and, if the
entity’s consequently decided to change regulators, shrink the budgets
of those regulatory agencies.161 This left a gaping hole in the
regulatory oversight of financial products.162
B. State Gap Filling and the Importance of a Dual-Enforcement
Regime
Eventually, states attempted to fill this gap.163 However,
federal regulators’ most destructive practice in the years leading up to
the mortgage crisis was the preemption of state attempts to enforce
state consumer protection laws.164 In several instances, regulators
preempted states that brought enforcement actions,165 but, instead of
taking up the action themselves, the regulators often simply dropped
any and all claims against the financial institutions.166 This pattern of
preemption and non-enforcement led Illinois Attorney General Lisa
Madigan to recognize that “a dual state-federal regulatory regime . . .
is vital to the health of our economy.”167
Beginning in the 1960s, recognizing the growing complexity
of consumer financial transactions, both federal and state governments
began to pass statutory protections for consumers.168 The most
important were those banning UDAPs.169 While the UDAP
prohibition started as a federal regulation enforced by the Federal
159

Id. at 93-95.
Totten supra note 28, at 125.
161
Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 90-95.
162
At the very least, it created significant “cracks” in the regulatory scheme.
Totten, supra note 28, at 122-25.
163
Id. at 123-24.
164
Id., at 123-25.
165
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 91-93.
166
See id. at 91-92 (detailing a specific case of preemption in California
involving the OCC).
167
Madigan Testimony, supra note 31, at 4.
168
Totten, supra note 28, at 119-20.
169
Id.
160
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Trade Commission (FTC), the states soon adopted their own UDAP
prohibitions in their respective consumer protection statutes and gave
their citizens a private right of action under the protection—
something which the federal statute lacked.170 Now, all fifty states
have at least some prohibition against deceptive acts.171 However,
these laws have varying degrees of strength and applicability.172 Most
states attempted to use these UDAP statutes to “regulate” consumer
financial products through litigation.173 While these laws provide for
private causes of action,174 there are still significant obstacles to
private enforcement.175 Instead, SAGs, with their expansive resources
and consumer complaint databases, are in a better position to enforce
these laws176 against the widespread abuses that students have
reported.177
However, SAG enforcement of state UDAP provisions faces
its own challenges. As discussed, a recent Ohio Supreme Court
decision, Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., neutered
that state’s consumer protection statute as applied to loan servicers.178
This would apply whether a private litigant or that State’s Attorney
General brought the action because in either case there would be no
contractual relationship between borrower and servicer, which is a
prerequisite to that state’s consumer protection statute.179 The Ohio
Attorney General participated in the litigation as an amicus curiae,
arguing that Ohio’s consumer protection statute covered loan
170

Id.
Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 50 State Report on
Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CENTER
(2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf.
172
See generally id. (discussing the strength and scope of all fifty states’ UDAP
prohibitions).
173
Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of
the Robo-Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 30 (2011) (“Across the nation, state
attorneys general have filed a number of high profile actions under state UDAP laws
and other consumer protection statutes against lenders active in the subprime
mortgage market over the last decade. Several high profile cases have resulted in
sweeping settlements that resulted in the payment of penalties and attorneys fees,
and forced lenders to reform their lending practices.” (emphasis added)).
174
Totten, supra note 28, at 121.
175
See supra Part III.
176
See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
177
See supra Section II.B.
178
See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
179
Id.
171
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servicers, as they provided a service to the borrower.180 The Court
disagreed and held that a servicer was not providing a service to the
consumer but to the lender.181
While Anderson is the most recent decision regarding state
UDAP
statutes’
applicability
to
lender–servicer–borrower
relationships, and one of the few decided by a state court, various
(albeit few) courts have weighed in on the issue, construing other state
UDAP provisions. Some courts have indicated that different states’
UDAP provisions would apply to loan servicers. These states include
California,182
Connecticut,183
Florida,184
New
Jersey,185
186
187
188
Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania,
South
Dakota,
and
Washington.189 However, other jurisdictions have taken a stance
180

Merit Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Ohio in Support of Respondent
Sondra Anderson, Anderson v. Barclay’s Capital Real Estate, Inc., 136 Ohio St. 3d
31, 2013-Ohio-1933, 989 N.E.2d 997 (No. 3:09-cv-02335-JGC).
181
Anderson, 989 N.E.2d 997, at 1001.
182
Young v. Wells Fargo, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1024-25 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(construing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (West 2008)).
183
Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011) (construing CONN. GEN STAT. §§ 42-110a–
110q (2010)). This decision is also the only decision cited here that expressly
involves student loan servicers as opposed to mortgage services. The decision is
particularly important and is discussed in more detail later. See infra notes 222, 228
and accompanying text.
184
In re G-Fees Antitrust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008)
(construing FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2007)) (explaining the change in Florida’s
consumer protection statute that now allows suits by anyone affected by a violation
instead of only those in a direct contractual relationship with the violating party).
185
Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 25 A.3d 1103, 1115-17 (N.J. 2011)
(construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 2010)). In New Jersey the statute is
interpreted broadly using three main elements as a guidepost to applicability: “(1) an
unlawful practice, (2) an ‘ascertainable loss,’ and (3) ‘a causal relationship between
the unlawful conduct and the ascertainable loss.’” Id. (quoting Lee v. Carter-Reed
Co., 4 A.3d 561, 576 (N.J. 2010)).
186
Hart v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. & Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n (In re Hart), 246
B.R. 709, 733-37 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000) (construing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, §
2(a) (1999)).
187
Vassalotti v. Wells Fargo Bank, 732 F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-511 (E.D. Penn.
2010) (construing 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-2(4)(xxi) (2009)).
188
Young v. Wells Fargo, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1032-33 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(construing S.D. CODIFIED Laws § 37-24-6 (2008)).
189
Birkholm v. Washington Mut. Bank, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1165-66 (W.D.
Wash. 2006) (construing WASH REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2005)) (“To prove a
violation of the CPA, a claimant must show: (1) an unfair or deceptive act; (2) the
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similar to Ohio and concluded that their consumer protection statutes
do not reach loan servicers. These jurisdictions include the District of
Columbia,190 Minnesota,191 Texas,192 and Virginia.193
While this issue has not been explicitly litigated in the
remaining states, four additional states have consumer protection
statutes that explicitly exempt the credit industry194—Louisiana,
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.195 Therefore, these
states’ UDAP provisions are also inapplicable in the lender–servicer–
borrower relationship.196 Further, Oregon’s statute does not apply to
consumer lending.197 Therefore, at least nine states (Louisiana,
Michigan, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
act occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce; (3) the act has an impact on the
public interest; (4) injury to the claimant; and (5) causation.” (emphasis added)
(citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 719 P.2d 531,
532-33. (Wash. 1986)). Therefore, under the Washington statute the courts look
more at the effect of the potentially unfair or deceptive act or practice than at the
relationship between the two parties. See id.
190
In re G-Fees Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 42-43 (D.D.C. 2008)
(construing D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901–3913 (2007) (holding that mortgagors are not
consumers of mortgage servicers, and that therefore, the D.C. consumer protection
statute does not apply).
191
Rossbach v. FBS Mortg. Corp., Nos. C3-97-1622, C9-97-1852, 1998 WL
156303, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1998) (construing MINN. STAT. §§ 325F.6870 (1996)) (concluding that a mortgage servicer was not covered by the Minnesota
consumer protection statute because the servicer did not provide a service to the
consumer and because the servicer did not offer merchandise to the consumer).
192
Rico v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, No. 3:10-CV-1643-L, 2011 WL 1792854 at
*4-5 (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2011) (construing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45
(West 2010)) (holding that mortgagors were not consumers of loan servicing
because servicing was only incidental to the reason for the consumer transaction:
purchasing a house).
193
In re G-Fees Anti-Trust Litigation, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (construing VA.
CODE ANN. § 59.1-200) (holding that neither Fannie Mae nor Freddie Mac provides
mortgagors with any good or service, and therefore, cannot be held liable under the
Virginia consumer protection statute); Salehi v. Wells Fargo, No. 1:11-cv-1323,
2012 WL 2119333 at *5-6 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2012).
194
See Carter, supra note 171, at 14.
195
Id.
196
Id. (“Despite the overwhelming problem of predatory and abusive lending,
five states—Louisiana, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Virginia—
immunize all or almost all lenders and creditors from the UDAP statute, regardless
of the unfair or deceptive nature of their practices.”).
197
Id. at 31 n.15 (citing Haeger v. Johnson, 548 P.2d 532 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)).
However, the issue has never made it to the Oregon Supreme Court. Id.
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Texas, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia cannot enforce their
UDAP provisions against student loan servicers.198 This number is
likely a low estimate, as many states have exemptions for banks and
for entities overseen by a regulator.199 Moreover, the states that have
UDAPs that cover mortgage loan servicers may face a fieldpreemption problem when attempting to apply these statutes to
student loan servicers.200 Therefore, it is possible that no state truly
has the power to hold servicers accountable for abusing students; the
issue of federal preemption as applied to student loan servicing will be
discussed shortly.201
While in the past states were largely preempted when it came
to holding mortgage servicers accountable,202 there were some
successes. The most important achievement was a $25 billion
settlement paid by mortgage servicers to all fifty SAGs.203 This
settlement was the culmination of a year-long investigation led by
SAGs.204 This one-time settlement, while certainly helpful, is less
useful than the powers SAGs had before federal regulators preempted
their consumer protection authority.205 However, there are some very
interesting aspects to this settlement, including substantive
requirements for mortgage servicers and the appointment of a monitor
to ensure that these requirements are met—truly a great example of
regulation through litigation.206
198

See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text.
Carter, supra note 171, at 13-14.
200
See infra notes 222-228 and accompanying text.
201
Id.
202
Eggert, supra note 37, at 207-13.
203
See id. at 216; State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement
with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, NAT’L ASS’N.
ATTORNEYS
GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/medianaag/media/naag-news/stateattorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largest-mortgageservicers-on-foreclosurewrongs.php?searched=Feds+Reach+%2425+Billion&advsearch=allwords&highligh
t=ajaxSearch_highlight+ajaxSearch_highlight1+ajaxSearch_highlight2+ajaxSearch
_highlight3+ajaxSearch_highlight4 (last visited Feb. 18, 2014) .
204
David McLaughlin & Tom Schoenberg, Foreclosure Settlement with Banks
Filed in Federal Court, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Mar. 12, 2012, 6:40 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-12/u-s-mortgage-foreclosure-settlementwith-banks-filed-in-federal-court.html.
205
Wilmarth Testimony, supra note 154, at 79.
206
State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, supra note 203.
199
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Therefore, while individual SAG actions against student loan
servicers might be successful, many states would likely still have
issues enforcing their consumer protection statutes due to the varying
applicability of each state’s statutes.207 Instead, the answer must come
from either greater federal oversight, which enables states to act as a
second line of defense,208 or SAG teamwork in a coordinated effort
similar to that of the national mortgage settlement.209 Fortunately, the
federal government has taken greater notice of the issues in the
financial consumer protection market in the past several years.210
V.

A NEW FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME: THE DODD–FRANK
ACT AND OTHER OBAMA ADMINISTRATION ACTIONS

After the subprime mortgage bubble burst and we entered an
economic recession, the federal government slowly realized that the
old regulatory scheme did not work.211 Therefore, the government
made several changes to the scheme, most importantly the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act).212 Included in these reforms were some very important changes
for state financial consumer protection enforcement, specifically a
statutory presumption against preemption of state consumer protection
laws.213 Further, the Act created the CFPB and gave it rulemaking
authority over certain consumer financial markets.214 Specific to
student loan servicing, on June 9, 2014, the Obama Administration
issued a presidential memorandum, regarding abuses in student loan
servicing, and the Department of Education announced that it would
be renegotiating its contracts with student loan servicers.215

207

See supra notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
See infra Section VI.C.
209
See infra Section VI.D.
210
See infra Part V. However, even these changes are not sufficient to defeat
the abuses of the student loan servicing market. See infra Section VI.A.
211
Totten, supra note 28, at 122-25 (discussing the “cracks in the foundation”
of the old consumer finance regulatory regime).
212
Id. at 125-28.
213
Id. at 128 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5551(d), 5587 (2012)). Therefore, “federal
law is [now] a floor, not a ceiling.” Id.; see also infra Section V.A.
214
See infra Section V.B.
215
See infra Section V.C.
208
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A. Statutory Changes
Procedurally, many scholars believe that the presumption
against preemption in Title X of the Dodd–Frank Act is one of the
most important fixes to federal consumer protection regulation since
the subprime mortgage crisis.216 Under this presumption, the Dodd–
Frank Act preempts only those state laws that are inconsistent with it,
and those laws are preempted only to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the Act.217 Further, state laws that provide additional
protections to consumers are not inconsistent.218 Additionally, the Act
mostly eliminates federal banking regulators’ claims that their
oversight field preempts any state attempts at regulation.219
[I]nstead [it] provides that state consumer financial
laws are preempted by national banks, thrift laws, and
regulations only in three circumstances: (1) if the state
consumer financial law would have a “discriminatory
effect on national banks” compared to state chartered
banks, (2) if “in accordance with the legal standard for
preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Barnett Bank . . . the State consumer
financial law prevents or significantly interferes with
the exercise by the national bank of its powers,” and if
(3) “the State consumer financial law is preempted by
a provision of Federal law other than this title.”220
However, regulation of federal student loan servicers could fall under
one of these exceptions because it is possibly preempted by another
provision of federal law.221 The courts are split on this issue: different
courts have held that the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) both

216

Eggert, supra note 37, at 217-24 (discussing the effect of the Dodd–Frank
Act on preemption of state consumer protection laws); Totten, supra note 28, at 128.
Contra Raymond Natter & Katie Wechsler, Dodd–Frank Act and National Bank
Preemption: Much Ado About Nothing, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 301, 304 (2012)
(finding Dodd–Frank’s preemption language not to be a material change).
217
12 U.S.C. § 5551(a).
218
12 U.S.C. § 5587.
219
Eggert, supra note 37, at 219-20 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
220
Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b).
221
12 U.S.C. § 25b.
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preempts and does not preempt state law claims.222 Because the HEA
is what may preempt state UDAP laws as applied to federal servicers,
and not the Dodd–Frank Act, the Act’s presumption against
preemption has not been of help in the field of federal student loan
servicing.
The cases so far make it clear that an explicit provision of the
HEA, which does not require disclosure, preempts any state law that
does contain a disclosure requirement.223 This provision states,
“[l]oans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program
authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act . . . shall not be
subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law.”224 More
drastically, the Ninth Circuit in Chae v. SLM Corp. held that this
provision bars any “state-law prohibition on misrepresenting a
business practice [because it] ‘is merely the converse’ of a state-law
requirement that alternate disclosures be made.”225 As the court itself
acknowledges, this means that consumers and SAGs will have
problems alleging a deceptive misrepresentation under state UDAP
laws.226
However, there is no definitive answer on whether the HEA
field preempts state UDAP prohibitions on deceptive practices. While
the Ninth Circuit in Chae held that it did,227 several courts, including
222

Chae v. SLM Corp., 593 F.3d 936, 942-43, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the plaintiff’s claims against Sallie Mae were both either expressly preempted or
field preempted). But see Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 599 (4th
Cir. 2005) (“The HEA and its regulations do not preempt the state law claims which
College Loan seeks to pursue in this proceeding.”); Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No.
FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011)
(distinguishing Chae and holding that the HEA did not field preempt Connecticut’s
consumer protection statute). However, the College Loan case did not implicate a
state consumer protection law, only state tort law. 396 F.3d at 598.
223
20 U.S.C. § 1098g.
224
Id.
225
Chae, 593 F.3d at 942-43 (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S.
504, 527 (1992)).
226
Id.
227
Id. at 947-50. (quoting Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 159, (1982)) (“Congress granted the DOE the power to prescribe regulations,
access lender records, audit participants, impose civil penalties, suspend or
terminate lenders from the program, and sue regulatory violators. A grant of ‘ample
authority’ to regulate a detailed legislative scheme, such as the one administered by
the DOE here, is evidence that Congress intended the agency to have the authority
to preempt state law.”).
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the Fourth Circuit in College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., have not
interpreted that provision of the HEA so broadly.228 But, if the Chae
view ultimately prevails, all fifty states will be powerless to prevent
abuses perpetrated by federal servicers (TIVASs), instead of only the
nine discussed above.229 Therefore, this Article advocates for the
CFPB to promulgate rules that will ultimately enable states act as a
second line of defense behind the CFPB.230
Other more substantive fixes to regulating mortgage servicers
in the Dodd–Frank Act include mandating the use of escrow
accounts,231 requiring responses to certain consumer inquiries,232 and
ensuring prompt crediting of loan payments.233 Unfortunately, these
fixes apply only to mortgage loans because of the inclusion of
language that qualifies their applicability to only those loans “secured
by a consumer’s principal dwelling.”234 Therefore, while the Dodd–
Frank Act has been, and should be, recognized for its positive effects
on the mortgage market,235 the Act’s presumption against preemption
228

Coll. Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588, 598-99 (4th Cir. 2005)
(holding the HEA does not preempt state tort law claims in a case between a lender
and a servicer); Kentucky ex rel. Conway v. Daymar Learning, Inc., 4:11CV-00103JHM, 2012 WL 1014989 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2012) (citing Adkins v. Excel College
of Corbin, Inc., Nos. 93-5138, 93-5139, 1994 WL 124268, *2 (6th Cir. April 11,
1994)); Bland v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., No. ELH–11–02812, 2012 WL 603194,
*4 (D. Md. Feb. 22, 2012) (citing College Loan Corp. v. SLM Corp., 396 F.3d 588
(4th Cir.2005)) (“[C]ourts that have addressed this issue have consistently held that
the HEA does not completely preempt state law claims.”); Brooks v. Salle Mae,
Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888 *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20,
2011) The Brooks court hung its coat on two different lines of reasoning. First, “the
fact that the HEA contains provisions that expressly preempt state law . . . precludes
a finding that the HEA occupies the regulatory field and leaves no room for state
law[,]” and second that “‘consumer protection is a field traditionally regulated by
the states . . . and the Supreme Court has . . . reaffirmed that there is a presumption
against finding implied preemption of state law in these fields.’” Id. (quoting Cliff v.
Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1126 (11th Cir. 2004)).
229
See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text.
230
See infra Section VI.C.
231
15 U.S.C. § 1639d.
232
12 U.S.C. § 2605.
233
15 U.S.C. § 1639f.
234
See, e.g., id. (“In connection with a consumer credit transaction secured by a
consumer’s principal dwelling, no servicer shall fail to credit a payment to the
consumer’s loan account as of the date of receipt.”) (emphasis added)).
235
See generally Eggert, supra note 37 (discussing the effect of the Dodd–
Frank Act on mortgages and preemption of state consumer protection laws); Totten,

Cox Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/9/15 5:45 PM

218

Vol. 27:2

Loyola Consumer Law Review

and more substantive statutory fixes will not be as useful for student
loan borrowers.
B. The Creation of a Federal Watchdog
In addition to these statutory changes dealing with preemption
and mortgage servicing, Congress, in the Dodd–Frank Act, created the
CFPB.236 The CFPB was originally the brainchild of Senator
Elizabeth Warren, who advocated for an agency with both the
“authority and motivation” to provide consumers with effective
protections.237 The CFPB has the power to “issu[e] rules, orders, and
guidance implementing Federal consumer financial law.”238 The
CFPB also has exclusive authority over federal depositories with over
$10 billion in assets, while the OCC, NCUA, and FDIC retain their
authority as to depositories with less than $10 billion in total assets.239
Additionally, the Dodd–Frank Act gave the CFPB supervisory
authority over certain non-bank persons.240 Unfortunately, the Dodd–
Frank Act again only recognizes the severity of servicing abuses in
the mortgage servicing market, not the student loan servicing
market.241 The Act grants the CFPB explicit authority over any person
who “offers or provides origination, brokerage, or servicing of loans
secured by real estate,” but only grants the CFPB supervisory
authority over any person who “offers or provides to a consumer any
private education loan.”242 The CFPB seems to confirm the absence of
the “origination, brokerage, or servicing” language leaves them
without the power to regulate private loan servicers unless that loan
servicer is also a large depository institution, barring special
circumstances.243 Although some commentators have read this section
supra note 28 (discussing how the Dodd–Frank Act affected the state consumer
protection regulation landscape).
236
12 U.S.C. § 5491.
237
See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 19, at 85.
238
12 U.S.C. § 5511.
239
12 U.S.C. §§ 5515-16.
240
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1).
241
Id.
242
Id. (emphasis added).
243
CFPB to Oversee Nonbank Student Loan Servicers, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(Dec.
3,
2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-to-oversee-nonbank-student-loanservicers/.
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differently,244 this Article will continue under the CFPB’s
interpretation that it does not have explicit statutory authority over
private loan servicers, which comports better with the plain language
of the statute.245
While the grant of authority over those institutions that offer
or provide student loans does not cover servicers, it has given the
CFPB a special interest in the student loan arena.246 Notably, the
CFPB passed a larger-participant rule, which took effect in March
2014.247 Larger-participant rules allow the CFPB to define certain
“larger participant[s] of a market for other consumer financial
products or services.”248 Once these participants of the market are
defined, the CFPB can then exercise supervisory authority over them
as if they were one of the non-bank persons over which the CFPB has
explicit authority.249 The CFPB has interpreted this power as
permitting the agency to select different criteria best suited to each
market to define what exactly would make a participant “larger.”250
Given the lack of explicit authority over student loan servicers, this
wide grant of authority is particularly important.251
The designation as a larger participant is critical because it
allows the CFPB to regulate the market through enforcement actions
under its UDAAP authority and helps the CFPB consider potential

244

Michael A. Benoit & Jeffrey P. Taft, CFPB Developments: Coordinating the
Supervision of Depository and Non-Depository Institutions, 68 BUS. L. 619, 621
(2013).
245
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1).
246
For instance, the CFPB has a very helpful website on paying for college.
Paying
for
College,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/paying-for-college/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2014); see
also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text (discussing the CFPB’s student loan
consumer-complaint database); see infra notes 258-263 (explaining the CFPB’s new
student loan servicer larger participant rule).
247
Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. 73,383 (Dec. 6, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Part 1090).
248
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(D).
249
12 U.S.C. Id. § 5514(b)(1).
250
CFPB Proposes Rule to Supervise Larger Participants in Consumer Debt
Collection and Consumer Reporting Markets, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION
BUREAU (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-proposes-rule-to-supervise-larger-participants-inconsumer-debt-collection-and-consumer-reporting-markets/.
251
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1).
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UDAPP-defining rules.252 In the new student loan servicing rule, the
Bureau stated that it “will be examining whether larger participants of
the student loan-servicing market engage in unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices (UDAAPs). Conduct that does not violate an
express prohibition of another Federal consumer financial law may
nonetheless constitute a UDAAP.”253
The extra “A” in this UDAAP is attributable to Congress’
extension of the old federal UDAP authority to also cover abusive
acts.254 Therefore, the CFPB now has authority over any “unfair,
deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”255 However, there is a critical
wrinkle in the power granted under this blanket UDAAP regulation.
While the CFPB will have the authority to enforce any UDAAP
violation, whether a specific rule defines the conduct as a UDAAP or
not, SAGs will not have the ability to enforce any potential UDAAP
violations until the CFPB has first issued a rule declaring that a
particular act or practice constitutes a UDAAP.256 The CFPB can pass
these UDAAP-defining rules, which “may include requirements for
the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.”257
As for the newly passed student loan servicer largerparticipant rule, the CFPB has determined that one is a larger
participant in the market if the entity and its affiliated companies
perform student loan servicing duties on over one million accounts.258
252

Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. at 73,387.
253
Id.
254
12 U.S.C. § 5531. There is quite a litany of fascinating scholarship on
exactly what the new abusive standard means. See Carey Alexander, Abusive:
Dodd–Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle to Protect Consumers, 85
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1105, 1127 (2011) (urging the CFPB to adopt an expansive
interpretation of what abusive means); Rebecca Schonberg, Introducing
“Abusive:”: A New and Improved Standard for Consumer Protection, 100 CAL. L.
REV. 1401, 1432-42 (2012) (discussing how abusive might cover some territory
beyond the prohibitions against unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
255
12 U.S.C. § 5531 (emphasis added).
256
12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(2)(B); Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223 (“In the area of
enforcement, there should be many enforcers. State Attorneys General will be able
to enforce both state and federal law with respect to national banks. There’s an odd
wrinkle here: state Attorneys General cannot enforce those statutory provisions on
unfair, deceptive and abusive practices but they will be able to enforce the rules
under those provisions.”).
257
12 U.S.C. § 5531(b).
258
12 C.F.R. § 1090.106(b) (2014).
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This covers all the government’s servicers (TIVASs) and two other
private loan servicers259 but may leave as much as 29% of the nonbank market unregulated.260 Like all other larger-participant rules, the
rule “does not impose new substantive consumer protection
requirements.”261 However, it is important to note that the oversight
allows the CFPB to gather better information on exactly what
practices servicers are engaging in that might constitute a violation of
the CFPB’s UDAAP power.262 Therefore, while this new rule is
hugely important for federal oversight of the market, it does nothing
to create greater state oversight as a second line of defense for
students or to protect students with private loans serviced by smaller
servicers.263 Instead, students serviced by the “smaller participants” of
the market must wait for the CFPB to pass substantive regulations on
what student loan servicers can and cannot do before SAGs will be
able to act as a second line of defense.264
C. An Executive Gesture
On June 9, 2014, President Obama announced in a presidential
memorandum executive-branch changes to the current system of
federal education lending.265 A presidential memorandum is widely
considered to be simply one form of an executive order in a legal
sense,266 although in the technical sense, it is not an executive order,
but an executive action.267 The only major announcement dealing with
259

Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed.
Reg. 73,383, 73,386-87 (Dec. 6, 2013).
260
Id.
261
Id. at 73,384.
262
Id. at 73,400.
263
12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(1) (“[W]ith respect to any person described in
subsection (a)(1) [which includes larger participants] the Bureau shall have
exclusive authority to enforce that Federal consumer financial law.”).
264
Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223.
265
Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014).
266
John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders:
Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 352, 352
n.152 (2010).
267
Id.; Dan Amira, President Obama Didn’t Sign Any Executive Orders Today,
DAILY
INTELLIGENCER
(Jan.
16,
2013),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/01/obama-23-executive-orders-actionsgun-control.html.
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federal student loan servicing in this memorandum was that “[b]y
December 31, 2014, the Secretary of Education shall develop,
evaluate, and implement new targeted strategies to reach borrowers
who may be struggling to repay their Federal student loans to ensure
that they have the information they need to select the best repayment
option and avoid future default.”268 The memorandum also announced
several other potential improvements to help students with their
loans.269 The biggest potential improvement deals with the wider
availability of alternative repayment plans for loans, and not with loan
servicing.270
On that same day the Department of Education also announced
that it would be “strengthen[ing] the incentives for loan contractors to
serve students well.”271 To do so, the Department announced it would
renegotiate its contracts with federal student loan servicers. However,
certain abuses such as extending student loan repayment and adding
excessive ancillary fees are not addressed in this action.272 The
incentives addressed will focus solely on helping students avoid
delinquency and default by granting bonuses to servicers for reducing
the default rates of their borrowers.273 While these two executive
actions will bring greater attention to the issue of student lending,
these actions may be nothing more than a gesture when it comes to the
issues of excessive ancillary fees and extending the length of time that
students remain in repayment.274
268

Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843.
269
Id.
270
Id. But see Anna Bahr, Obama’s Move to Help Students Is Not as Forgiving
as
It
Seems,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
23,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/24/upshot/obamas-move-to-help-students-is-notas-forgiving-as-it-seems.html?_r=0 (discussing why this change might not be
enough.).
271
The White House, Office of the President, FACTSHEET: Making Student
Loans
More
Affordable,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(June
9,
2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/09/factsheet-making-studentloans-more-affordable.
272
Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843.
273
Stratford supra note 29 (“Officials have renegotiated the government’s contracts
with the four main loan servicers, which together collect payments for tens of
millions of federal student loan borrowers. The servicers will now also receive
bonuses for reducing the delinquency rates of their borrowers.”),
274
See infra text accompanying notes 313-319.
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SERVICING SOLUTIONS TO UNSHACKLE STUDENTS

At this point, one question remains: did the federal consumer
financial regulatory overhaul led by the Dodd–Frank Act do enough
to free students from servicer abuses, or are student borrowers still
slave to the servicer? The new scheme undoubtedly provides greater
accountability in the mortgage servicing market275 and, in general,
provides SAGs with greater authority in the field of financial
consumer protection than they had in the years prior to the passage of
the Dodd–Frank Act.276 However, with the growing abuses reported in
the field of student loan servicing,277 the inherent vulnerabilities of the
average student borrower,278 and the effect that high student loan debt
has on other financial markets,279 it is absolutely critical that student
loan servicers are held accountable.
While the executive branch as a whole and the CFPB
particularly seem headed towards greater market oversight,280 states
should be proactive in creating a strong dual-enforcement regime to
protect students from unscrupulous student loan servicing practices.
After all, preemption and federal inaction played a large role in
precipitating the subprime mortgage crisis.281 To allow states to act as
a second line of defense, the CFPB should take action by adopting
UDAAP-defining rules.282 If they do not, greater accountability could
275

Eggert, supra note 37, at 217-24.
Totten, supra note 28, at 174 (“Empowering states to enforce federal law
was only one of multiple strategies Congress employed in the wake of the Great
Recession to protect consumers in the financial marketplace. Nonetheless, this
strategy is critical.”).
277
See supra Section II.B.
278
See supra Section II.A.
279
See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing the “domino effect”
that high student loan debt is having on other markets such as housing and smallbusiness start-ups).
280
Rohit Chopra, We Asked About Your Student Loans and You Answered,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROTECTION
BUREAU
(Feb.
3,
2014),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/we-asked-about-your-student-loans-and-youanswered/ (discussing CFPB action on the issue of student loans, including the
larger participant rule and providing a form letter for students to use in their
communications with servicers).
281
Eggert, supra note 37, at 207-13.
282
This Article argues that it should and that doing so is the best of the possible
options for student borrowers. See infra Section VI.C.
276
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be accomplished in two other ways: (1) through greater consumer
choice in federal loan programs;283 and (2) through a multi-state SAG
enforcement action led by SAG in states with the strongest consumer
protection statutes.284
A. Why the Current Regulatory Scheme Is Insufficient
The most glaring issue with the new federal scheme is that the
2010 consumer financial protection reforms are too finely tuned to the
causes of the 2008 mortgage crisis and apply exclusively to mortgage
servicing and Dodd–Frank Act preemption.285 This leaves regulation
of student loan servicers to other means, namely rules developed by
the CFPB pursuant to its Dodd–Frank Act authority.286 Unfortunately,
the only current CFPB rule on the issue is the larger-participant rule,
which provides only for CFPB oversight—not any substantive
protections.287 The lack of any other significant regulation presents
two issues.
First, the lack of substantive, UDAAP-defining rules leaves
the states with only their own UDAP bans as the basis for any
authority over student loan servicers until the CFPB passes a rule
determining what specific acts or practices constitute a UDAAP
violation under its rulemaking authority.288 With the Dodd–Frank
Act’s focus on dual-enforcement authority for federal and state
regulators as well as SAGs traditionally important role as consumer
advocates, such a result is puzzling.289 Further, any SAG claiming to
bring an action within the scope of their UDAP powers must actually
plan on bringing an action, instead of merely using any investigative
authority they may have under their state’s UDAP statute as a way to
oversee the servicer in question.290 The Supreme Court deemed such a

283

See infra Section VI.B.
See infra Section VI.D.
285
See supra Section V.A.
286
12 U.S.C. §§ 5511-14 (2012).
287
See supra notes 258-261 and accompanying text.
288
12 U.S.C. § 5514(c)(1) (“[W]ith respect to any person described in
subsection (a)(1) . . . the Bureau shall have exclusive authority to enforce that
Federal consumer financial law.”).
289
See Totten, supra note 28, at 123-25; Hillebrand, supra note 27, at 223.
290
See Totten, supra note 29, at 145 (citing Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n,
L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009)).
284
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use of investigatory powers an illegal exercise of “visitorial
powers.”291 Therefore, states cannot regulate without the intent to
actually litigate. An even bigger problem remains, however, because
states that actually attempt to litigate might be preempted by the
HEA.292
Second, by definition, the CFPB can only regulate larger
participants of the student loan servicing market under largerparticipant rules, leaving smaller participants unregulated by the
CFPB.293 These smaller servicers would then be free from federal
oversight, unlike their larger brothers and sisters.294 This could leave
as much as 29% of the non-bank market unregulated at the federal
level.295 It would then be solely up to state UDAP prohibitions—
which vary greatly in their applicability296—to protect student
borrowers from smaller servicers.
Therefore, depending upon the scope of each state’s consumer
protection provisions297 and how courts interpret the HEA,298 there are
likely large holes in the new regulatory scheme. Regardless, nine
states and the District of Columbia are unambiguously unable to use
their UDAP power to protect students from servicer abuses.299 If the
view of the Ninth Circuit prevails over the Fourth Circuit and other
courts on HEA preemption,300 then the lack of UDAAP-defining rules
and the inability of the CFPB to regulate smaller participants creates
two even larger problems: (1) TIVASs would be subject solely to
CFPB oversight; and (2) most non-TIVASs would not be subject to
any oversight.

291

Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 536. This decision was later adopted in Dodd–Frank and
is now codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b).
292
See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertain
status of HEA preemption of state consumer protection laws).
293
12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(b), (a)(2).
294
While it is not entirely clear how many servicers will end up being covered
by the larger participant rule, the final rule states that it is likely that seven entities
would be covered by this rule. Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan
Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,395-96 (Dec. 6, 2013).
295
See supra note 259-260 and accompanying text.
296
See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text.
297
See supra notes 178-193 and accompanying text.
298
See supra notes 222-228 and accompanying text.
299
See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text.
300
See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
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Because the HEA would preempt the forty-one state
UDAPs,301 which may apply to student loan servicers,302 TIVASs and
the one or two other larger participants would be regulated solely by
the CFPB under the larger-participant rule. This CFPB regulation
would consist of oversight only for blanket, undefined UDAAP
violations.303 Therefore, if the CFPB was ever subject to “agency
capture”304 by the servicing market, there would be no oversight of
the nation’s largest student loan servicers.305
Even more problematic, most non-TIVASs would not be
subject to any federal regulation,306 unless the non-TIVAS was also a
large depository institution307 or one of the few additional servicers
covered by the larger-participant rule.308 Given the fact that these
servicers are by definition smaller, it is unlikely that many fit these
exceptions. However, SAGs would have the power to regulate these
non-TIVAS smaller-participant servicers because SAGs would not be
preempted by the HEA, which regulates only TIVASs,309 and the
Dodd–Frank Act’s presumption against preemption would ensure that
the CFPB’s authority over the few non-TIVAS larger participants did
not preempt state UDAP bans.310 But, in the nine states whose UDAP
statutes would be unambiguously inapplicable to any lender–servicer–

301

See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-189, 199 and accompanying text.
303
See supra notes 258-264 and accompanying text.
304
Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and
the Lessons It Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 106 n.142
(“Agency capture is the control or domination of administrative agencies by private
parties who are subject to the regulatory authority of the agency. It occurs when a
regulated entity, for example a group of corporations, replaces the public-policy
agenda of the agency with its own private and self-serving agenda through lobbying
or other influential methods.”).
305
See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection:
How the Dodd–Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273,
1296 (2011) (“In spite of these reasons for optimism that the CFPB will be able to
fulfill its mission, capture remains a serious threat: considering the lobbying power
of the financial industry, it will likely be aggressive in its attempt to capture the
CFPB.”).
306
See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
307
See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
308
See supra note 259 and accompanying test.
309
See supra note 117.
310
See supra notes 219-220 and accompanying text.
302
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borrower relationship,311 these smaller participants would be left
completely unregulated. Even if these servicers constitute only a small
fragment of the student loan servicing industry—the CFPB estimates
this could leave as much as 29% of the nonbank market
uncovered312—a complete lack of regulation of even a small number
of servicers is disconcerting.
Further, President Obama’s new presidential memorandum on
select issues confronting students with education loans amounted to
no more than a gesture with no effect on the issues addressed in this
Article. In terms of servicing, the memorandum only directed the
Secretary of the Department of Education to develop “targeted
strategies” to help students pick the right repayment plan.313
Moreover, the Department of Education’s renegotiation of contracts
with servicers to provide servicers incentives to help students avoid
delinquency and default addressed neither the issue of excessive and
abusive ancillary fees, nor servicers improperly keeping student loans
in repayment.314 Additionally, these incentives largely consist of
paying servicers bonuses for reducing the rate of delinquency or
default of the borrowers they service.315 However, federal loans are
already structured to compensate servicers better when loans are kept
out of delinquency or default.316 Therefore, it is unclear how an
additional bonus would make a difference in this area, especially
when servicers could simply make up any difference in payment by
charging a greater number of ancillary fees or larger amounts in
ancillary fees to those students’ loans.317 Moreover, this executive
action will do nothing for the students who do not borrow from the
federal government, namely the students who borrow from the
potentially completely unregulated smaller participants.318 Therefore,
311

See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text.
See supra note 259-260 and accompanying text.
313
Helping Struggling Federal Student Loan Borrowers Manage Their Debt, 79
Fed. Reg. 33,843 (June 9, 2014).
314
The White House, Office of the President, supra note 271; Stratford supra
note 29.
315
Stratford supra note 29 (“The servicers will now also receive bonuses for
reducing the delinquency rates of their borrowers”).
316
See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
317
Remember, the federal government as well as private lenders generally
allow servicers to keep any ancillary fees assessed. Levitin & Twomey, supra note
13, at 41.
318
See supra notes 258-263 and accompanying text.
312
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these well-intentioned federal actions on the problems in the student
loan servicing market are too narrowly tailored to delinquency and
default, and they fail to fix the problems that many students continue
to report to the CFPB.319 Further action must be taken.
B. Consumer Choice
A more free-market approach to fixing the reported student
loan servicing abuses would be to allow student loan borrowers
greater freedom in choosing their servicer.320 Currently, students are
not given a choice over who services their federal loans.321 The
federal government, while still retaining control over which entities
qualify for student loan servicing, could allow students to pick which
of these servicers they wanted. But, even in the field of private student
loans, where students could technically bargain over which entity
services their loan,322 the relative differences in bargaining experience
and power between the two parties makes such an exercise beneficial
for only a limited number of the most sophisticated student
borrowers.323 Remember, most students taking out student loans have
little to no experience in taking out a loan of that size.324
The government could help make a student’s decision an
informed one by giving the information the government uses to
measure servicer performance directly to the student when it comes
time for him or her to choose a servicer.325 This information could be
made available to all student borrowers through the Department of
Education and CFPB websites, so as to enable easy access to servicerperformance information, leveling the bargaining field between

319

See generally Annual Report of the CFPB Student Loan Ombudsman, supra
note 56.
320
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83 (discussing the possibility of
consumers bargaining over assignability of mortgage servicing).
321
See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text.
322
See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 83.
323
See Lary Lawrence, Toward a More Efficient and Just Economy: An
Argument for Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 815,
825-26 (1987) (discussing inherent weaknesses in consumers that more
sophisticated sellers frequently exploit).
324
See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
325
See DiGangi, supra note 15 (discussing the current federal report card used
to evaluate student loan servicers).
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student and servicer.326 However, more than just information is
necessary to make the correct decision. Students must also possess the
ability to decipher such information.327 The government could
ameliorate this concern by presenting the information in the form of
an easy-to-use, easy-to-comprehend website that employs comparison
tools.328
This solution would vary in three significant ways from past
attempts at consumer self-protection, which have been notoriously
unsuccessful.329 First, it would give students the ability to avoid any
potentially unscrupulous practices in the first place, instead of having
to first suffer the consequences of such practices to bring a lawsuit.
Second, it would likely be more effective than lawsuits, which are
largely not worth a student’s time and money due to the nature of the
seemingly insignificant fees these servicers charge.330 However, these
fees do add up when assessed to a multitude of borrowers.331 Third,
students would no longer be at the mercy of the court system in
determining whether they have contractual privity to bring a common
law claim332 or whether their state UDAP provision covered loan
servicers.333
However, even if the government gave students the
information necessary for them to make an informed decision,
significant obstacles to a consumer-choice solution remain. First, for
the proposed information-sharing website this solution is based on to
help all students, the government would have to start collecting
information for private servicers as well, instead of just TIVASs.334
326

This is an important concept in consumer law. See Lawrence, supra note
323, at 818-19 (discussing the importance of making information available to
consumers and the lack of an incentive for sellers to do so).
327
Id. at 825 (discussing the need for consumers to possess the ability to select
which information is most relevant for them).
328
The CFPB, in the context of choosing how to pay for college, has a great
website for the template of such a site. See generally Paying for College, supra note
246.
329
See supra Part III.
330
Levitin & Twomey, supra note 13, at 43.
331
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
332
See supra pp. 201-02 (detailing the availability of common-law claims
against servicers).
333
See supra pp. 209-12 (discussing the applicability of state-specific UDAP
statutes to claims against servicers).
334
See DiGangi, supra note 15.
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Such an undertaking would likely require a prohibitive influx of
staffing and money. Second, because students often overestimate their
ability to pay back loans, they will likely not worry over who is
servicing their loans.335 Third, it is extremely doubtful that young
consumers would research a product even if the information is freely
available. Therefore, while front-end consumer choice is potentially a
more appealing option than back-end enforcement, this solution still
faces a significant obstacle in the form of the overly optimistic and
hard-to-inform student.336 Due to these concerns, and potentially
others,337 this Article advocates consumer choice only as an
alternative to a stronger dual-enforcement regime. This alternative is
posed largely due to the recognition that not all policymakers will be
receptive to the idea of greater government oversight and that some
change in this market is preferable to no change whatsoever.
However, a stronger dual-enforcement regime, whether accomplished
by CFPB rulemaking or a SAG settlement, would best solve the
problems that plague the market.338
C. Defining UDAAPs in the Student Loan Servicing Market
The best possible fix to the current regulatory regime would be
further CFPB involvement. While the student loan servicer largerparticipant rule was an important step on the road to greater
oversight,339 it did not provide for any substantive protections.340 The
CFPB should pass rules defining exactly what constitutes a UDAAP.
This would implicitly give SAGs the authority to prevent and punish
these specific UDAPs, thereby creating a state–federal dualenforcement regime.341

335

See Simpson, supra note 50.
See supra Section II.A.
337
Additional concerns would be the cost of this solution and whether such a
solution would be feasible.
338
See supra Sections VI.C-D.
339
See supra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.
340
See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
341
See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing how once the CFPB
has defined what specifically constitutes a UDAAP, pursuant to their rule-making
authority, SAGs can enforce that prohibition, but until then, only the CFPB can
enforce the blanket UDAAP prohibition).
336
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These rules should focus specifically on the abuses that
consumers reported to the CFPB.342 These rules should include
requirements that forbid servicers from giving inaccurate pay-off
information343 and from placing students in the wrong repayment
plan.344 Further, these rules should require that servicers apply both
over- and underpayments in the way specified by the student,345 apply
payments in a timely manner,346 and give students adequate notice if
their loan servicer changes.347 Finally, if the borrower did not specify
a way to apply the payments, the rules should require that the
payments will be applied in a way that avoids as many late fees as
possible and pays off the loans with the highest interest rates and
principal amounts first.348 These changes would eliminate the abuses
reported to the CFPB and would prevent servicers from abusing
students by charging excessive ancillary fees and extending students’
time in debt repayment.349
A major drawback to the CFPB passing UDAAP-defining
regulations would be the added costs to both businesses and
government. The costs would likely be similar to the costs the CFPB
noted when they adopted the larger-participant rule.350 The CFPB
noted that, while the rule might result in increased operating costs, the
costs of compliance would largely be borne by the larger participants,
not students.351 “While the price of servicing Federal student loans
might change, depending on market conditions, the pricing for and
access to Federal student loans would likely not change substantially
as a consequence of increases in servicers’ compliance with Federal
consumer financial law.”352 The Bureau, using prior mortgageservicer investigations as a guide, estimated that a servicer would
spend roughly $24,000 in assuring compliance during a normal larger342

See supra Section II.B.
See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
344
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
345
See supra notes 68, 77-79 and accompanying text.
346
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
347
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
348
See supra notes 68, 77-79 and accompanying text.
349
See supra Section II.B.
350
See Defining Larger Participants of the Student Loan Servicing Market, 78
Fed. Reg. 73,383, 73,400-03 (Dec. 6, 2013).
351
Id. This would be especially true for federal student loans with interest rates
and loan limits that are determined statutorily. Id. at 73,400.
352
Id.
343
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participant examination.353 However, one could assume that an
examination into a more specific UDAAP violation would not be as
expensive as this overall UDAAP-compliance figure. While costs
could rise if SAGs and the CFPB do not coordinate and each bring
separate examinations over similar violations, each SAG is required to
provide the CFPB with a copy of the complaint so as to encourage
consultation.354 Therefore, the costs of any added regulations would
not be felt by students and, at a cost of likely less than $24,000,
should be negligible for these financial services companies.
Defined-UDAAP regulations provide three benefits: (1) easier
adjudication of UDAAP violations; (2) upfront notice to servicers as
to what constitutes a UDAAP; and (3) a second line of defense for
students in the form of SAG enforcement of these rules. First, instead
of the CFPB having to prove that a certain set of acts or practices by a
servicer was unfair, deceptive, or abusive, a definition of acts and
practices that constitute UDAAPs will allow the CFPB to simply
prove that the act occurred, and at that point, the action will be
deemed either unfair, deceptive, or abusive as a matter of law.355
Second, clear regulations will give servicers upfront notice as to what
constitutes a UDAAP and will help prevent students from being
subjected to that act or practice in the first place.356 Third, the
importance of a dual-enforcement financial consumer protection
regime is monumental.357 If the CFPB does not define what
constitutes a UDAAP, at least nine states and the District of Columbia
will be unable to protect students from servicer abuses.358
Additionally, depending upon how the HEA preemption battle plays
out, state UDAP claims against federal student loan servicers could be
preempted.359 Further, SAGs would be empowered to monitor smaller
participants, who, without UDAAP-defining rules, are left
353

Id. at 73,402.
12 U.S.C. § 5552(b)(1)(A) (2012) (“[T]o enforce any provision of this title,
including any regulation prescribed by the Bureau under this title, a State attorney
general or State regulator shall timely provide a copy of the complete complaint to
be filed and written notice describing such action or proceeding to the Bureau and
the prudential regulator.”).
355
12 U.S.C. § 5531(b).
356
See id.
357
See, e.g., supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
358
See supra notes 181, 190-197 and accompanying text.
359
See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text.
354
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unregulated at the federal level and completely unregulated in the nine
states without UDAPs that apply in the lender–servicer–borrower
context.360 Without states to act as this second line of defense, the
specter of agency capture looms large, as it does with any agency that
has exclusive authority over a field of law.361 While the CFPB is
designed to be insulated from agency capture,362 it would be more
difficult—if not impossible—for the student loan servicing market to
“capture” both the CFPB and all fifty SAGs.
D. SAG Teamwork: Regulation Through Litigation
Alternatively, SAGs should band together in a fifty-state
enforcement action against student loan servicers.363 SAGs have often
aided each other in situations where one has a stronger enforcement
regime than another.364 One major drawback to this approach is that it
is reactionary and not preventative. Instead of monitoring student loan
servicers to prevent unsavory practices the CFPB has defined as
UDAAPs on the front end, SAGs would be litigating against these
practices on the back end—after they have already occurred.
However, through such a suit, SAGs may be able to obtain a
settlement that provides for substantive protections.

360

See supra notes 293-294 and accompanying text. See supra notes 377-381
and accompanying text, for a complete discussion on why SAGs are important in
the dual-enforcement regime advocated here.
361
See supra notes 304-305 and accompanying text.
362
See generally Michael C. Nissim-Sabat, Capturing This Watchdog? The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Keeping the Special Interests Out of Its
House, 40 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing how the CFPB can avoid
regulatory capture).
363
See supra notes 181-197 and accompanying text. One other potential
solution, which is outside the scope of this Article, would be a movement in the
states whose statutes do not apply to loan servicers to adopt a more inclusive UDAP
statute. One example of a helpful formulation is that of the State of Washington,
which focuses on the effect of the violation and not necessarily the identity of the
violator. See supra note 189. This solution is not seriously considered in this Article
because of the difficulty in getting at least ten sovereigns to pass such statutes.
364
This Article has already discussed one such example. See supra note 203
and accompanying text. However, some commentators disapprove of this practice.
See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78
U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 542 (2009) (calling SAGs “wolf packs” who attack financial
institutions).
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This is exactly what SAGs did when they settled with
mortgage servicers in 2012.365 In addition to the $25 billion payout to
SAGs, some of the substantive protections included “requiring a
single point of contact for borrowers, establishing case review and
paperwork processing requirements and deadlines, and restricting
practices such as ‘dual tracking’ (when banks pursue a loan
modification while simultaneously pursuing a foreclosure).”366 This
settlement not only provided for these substantive requirements, but
also provided for a monitor to ensure compliance with these agreed-to
protections.367 The monitor, while lacking enforcement power in
itself, serves as an alert system for the D.C. court to enforce the
requirements.368
From a practical standpoint, the suit must be led by a SAG
with ample statutory authority under that state’s s UDAP. The
Connecticut Attorney General would be an ideal candidate because
Connecticut has strong consumer protection laws for student loan
servicers369 that are not HEA field preempted under Connecticut state
court precedent.370 The suit would ideally result in a settlement that
incorporated the substantive protections discussed above in the
context of CFPB rulemaking.371 Additionally, this settlement should
provide for a monitor to alert the court if servicers are not adhering to
these provisions.372
This strategy is not without its risks. First, there is the cost of
litigation. In the mortgage settlement, the executive committee that
negotiated the final agreement required $10 million in attorneys’

365

State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs, supra note 203.
366
Id.
367
Id.
368
Frequently Asked Questions, OFF. MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT,
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/faqs/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
369
Brooks v. Salle Mae, Inc., No. FSTCV096002530S, 2011 WL 6989888, at
*7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2011) (construing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42–110(a), et
seq. (2010)).
370
Id. However, this will ultimately be an issue for the federal courts to decide,
which are currently split on this issue. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying
text.
371
See supra notes 342-347 and accompanying text.
372
See supra note 368 and accompanying text.
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fees,373 and this amount did not cover what each state individually
spent.374 A repeat performance of such a well-orchestrated settlement
might be hard to come by, and if SAGs lose, they will have to foot the
bill on their own. However, SAGs have successfully banded together
in other lawsuits, including the national tobacco settlement.375 This
uncertainty should not deter SAGs—the abuses documented in the
student loan servicing market should give them ample incentive and
bargaining power in any potential suit.376
Much like CFPB UDAAP-defining rules, the positives of a
settlement with substantive protections would be a dual-enforcement
regime and upfront notice to servicers as to what constitutes a
UDAAP.377 Using SAGs as a second line of defense presents at least
three major benefits. First, with their local consumer complaint
systems, SAGs are truly in the best position to hear the issues
prevalent in their local market.378 Second, SAGs are also more nimble
than a large regulatory agency like the CFPB.379 And third, almost all
SAGs are elected,380 whereas the Director of the CFPB is

373

National Mortgage Settlement Summary, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/national-mortgagesettlement-summary.aspx (last updated Sept. 4, 2013).
374
See id. (discussing how each SAG who signed the final judgment allocated
its split of the settlement funds for attorneys’ fees).
375
The ABCs of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement, NAT’L ASS’N
ATTORNEYS
GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume_1_number_2/the_abcs_of_the
_tobacco_master_settlement_agreement.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2015) (discussing
the 46-state tobacco settlement).
376
See supra Section II.B. However, SAGs will lose all bargaining power if the
court hearing the case finds that the state consumer protection statute is preempted
by the HEA. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (discussing the
current stance of courts on the issue of HEA preemption of state consumer
protection statutes).
377
See supra notes 357-362 and accompanying text.
378
See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
379
Chatman, supra note 33, at 606 (commenting that Washington has been too
slow to react to changes in the mortgage servicing industry); Sarah W. Rubenstein,
Comment, CERCLA’s Contribution to the Federal Brownfields Problem: A
Proposal for Federal Reform, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 149, 163 (1997)
(commenting that because states are smaller and “more centralized,” they are more
nimble than the federal government).
380
Attorney General Election Updates, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN.,
http://www.naag.org/publications/naagazette/volume-4-number-9/attorney-general-
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appointed.381 This direct link to the voters makes SAGs more
accountable to students than the bureaucrats at the CFPB.382
Therefore, if the CFPB does not act, SAGs must take matters into
their own hands and become the emancipators that students so
desperately need.
VII.

CONCLUSION

While many problems exist within the field of student lending,
one area that has yet to receive enough attention is student loan
servicing. Student loan servicers have engaged in a pattern of
unsavory, and frankly illegal, practices aimed at increasing their profit
margins, including charging students excessive ancillary fees and
engaging in conduct that causes students to spend more time in
repayment, accruing interest on the underlying debt.383 While students
are unlikely to be able to defend themselves in court,384 a consumerchoice solution coupled with better access to servicer information
might result in students stemming the abuse themselves.385 However,
this is unlikely.386
Students deserve a stronger regulatory regime to free them
from the servicing abuses that are preventing them from pursuing
their dreams. One of the major issues in the subprime mortgage crisis
was the lack of meaningful mortgage servicer regulation.387 Despite
improvements to the federal consumer protection scheme since that
time,388 significant gaps in student loan servicer oversight still
remain.389 Therefore, either the CFPB or SAGs must act to gain
election-updates.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2015) (“The Attorney General is
popularly elected in 43 states . . . .”).
381
12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
382
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993) (stating that democracy
requires lawmaking that is done by elected officials rather than unaccountable
bureaucrats).
383
See supra Section II.B.
384
See supra Part III.
385
See supra Section VI.B.
386
See supra Section VI.B.
387
See supra Section IV.A.
388
See supra Part V.
389
See supra Section VI.A.
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substantive protections for student borrowers and to provide for a
strong state–federal dual-enforcement regime.390 Until then, the
student borrower is most certainly slave to the servicer.

390

See supra Section VI.C-D.

